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officials refuse to act. It strikes fear in the hearts of would-be crimi-
nals. The very fact that it will meet at stated intervals serves as a
check on local officials and insures that they will carry out their duties
in a proper manner. Therefore, it is clear that a provision should be
made for periodic calling of the grand jury. Section 114 of the Ameri-
can Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "No grand
jury shall be summoned to attend at any court except upon the order
of a judge thereof when in his opinion public interest so demands,
except that a grand jury shall be summoned at least once a year in
each county." The requirement of empaneling a grand jury each year
has been criticized on the ground that it would subject some counties
to needless expense since grand juries are not always needed that
often. It has been suggested that the grand jury should be convened
only when the prosecuting attorney asks the judge for the assistance
of one or whenever the judge himself thinks there is a necessity for
one.25 However, it is believed that if the calling of a grand jury is to
have the desired effect on the public, it should be called at periodic
intervals. The judge or prosecuting attorney for reasons of his own
may not desire the calling of such a body. Therefore, it is apparent
that a provision should be made for the periodic calling of a grand
jury, since this will enable any aggrieved person to present com-
plaints. If no complaints are presented, the grand jury can be dis-
missed.
In summary, there should be no objection to a system which
would authorize the prosecution of all felonies by either information
or indictment and which would still allow the court an opportunity to
summon a grand jury if one were deemed necessary, and, in any event,
at least once a year. It is believed that the return of an indictment by
a grand jury, in each and every case, is no longer necessary for a cer-
tain and safe administration of justice.
Beauchamp E. Brogan
PERSONAL PROPERTY-DELIVERY OF GIFTS IN KENTUCKY
There are three traditional requirements for a valid gift: (1)
donative intent, (2) delivery by the donor, and (3) acceptance by
the donee.' This note is concerned only with the requirement of
25 Morse, supra note 22 at 864-365.
1 Brown, Personal Property, 132 (1936). This author states that the require-
ment of acceptance is frequently omitted in modern cases in view of "the well-
nigh universal holding that when the gift is beneficial the presumption is that
the gift is accepted by the donee." The Kentucky Court of Appeals subscribes
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delivery in Kentucky, whether actual, constructive or symbolic. It
defines the three types of delivery, discusses certain Kentucky decisions
illustrating recurring delivery situations, and suggests a step-by-step
procedure for determining the type and validity of delivery in specific
cases.
I
At the early common law delivery was a relatively simple matter.
As stated by Bracton, no gift of a chattel was complete without tradi-
tion of the subject of the gift.2 To the medieval mind such a require-
ment was not onerous; it flowed naturally from the rule requiring
livery of seisin for the transfer of land. As a modem concept, however,
manual tradition would be extremely confining. Under the burden of
such a requirement, attempts to give choses in action, bank deposits,
shares in jointly owned property and many other common types of
personal property would be consistently frustrated. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the courts have developed the concepts of con-
structive and symbolic delivery and have broadened the concept of
actual delivery beyond its historical limits. In keeping with this de-
velopment, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has often said that de-
livery may be actual, constructive, or symbolic,3 and has frequently
upheld gifts that would have shocked Bracton and his thirteenth
century colleagues.
However, the Court has not conclusively defined or limited any
of the three types of delivery, and frequently does not label the type
to this view, stating, in the recent case of Aubrev's Adm'x. v. Kent, 292 Ky. 740,
167 S.W. 2d 831, 833 (1942), that a valid gift only requires a "delivery of
possession, actual, constructive, or symbolic, with the intention to transfer title,
permanently if inter vivos, either conditionally or permanently if causa mortis."
This statement of the Kentucky requirements, of course, is broad and includes
both gifts causa morts and inter vivos between which, for purposes of this note,
no distinction need be made. For situations involving only gifts inter vivos the
court has been more explicit, requiring the following: (1) that there be a
competent donor, (2) that there be an intention on his part to make a gift, (3)
that there be a donee capable to take it, (4) that the gift be complete with
nothing left undone, (5) that the property must be delivered and go into effect
at once, and, (6) that the gift be irrevocable. See Hurley v. Schuler, 298 Ky. 118,
176 S.W. 2d 275 (1943); Lyle v. Snowden's Adm'x, 295 Ky. 505, 174 S.W. 2d
691 (1943); Gernert v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Co. of Louisville, 284
Ky. 575, 145 S.W. 2d 522 (1940); Hart v. Hart, 272 Ky. 488, 114 S.W. 2d 747
(1938). It is suggested that the first, third and fourth of these are implicit in
the traditional requirements and, therefore, that the formula prescribed here
would apply equally well to gifts causa mortis save for the sixth point which is
peculiar to gifts inter vivos.
2 1 Bracton, De Legibus, 128 (1640).
3 Hardy v. St. Matthews' Community Center, 267 S.W. 2d 72.5 (Ky. 1954);
Aubrey's Adm'x v. Kent, 292 Ky. 740, 167 S.W. 2d 831 (1942); Farris v. Farris,
269 Ky. 466, 107 S.W. 2d 299 (1937); Drake v. Security Trust Co., 203 Ky.
733, 263 S.W. 4 (1924); Taylor v. Purdy, 151 Ky. 82, 151 S.W. 45 (1912).
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of delivery at all, saying only that a delivery must be made in such a
way as the nature and circumstances of the gift permit.4 Occasionally
the court uses the terms constructive and symbolic delivery, but re-
fuses to distinguish between them.5 And in one case," it has even
called symbolic delivery a type of constructive delivery. This con-
sistent refusal to describe the delivery in concrete terms has caused
unnecessary confusion which can only be eliminated through careful
definition of each of the types of delivery and use of these definitions
by the Court in making its decisions.
In attempting to define actual, constructive, and symbolic delivery
one is forced to admit that the Kentucky court is not without some
justification for its avoidance of the terms. Except for actual delivery,
which is generally considered to be synonymous with manual tradition,
there is considerable confusion and difference of opinion in the authori-
ties as to the delivery situations included in each category. Ballentine,
for instance, defines symbolic and constructive delivery in terms of
each other, describing constructive delivery as a type of symbolic
delivery and symbolic delivery as a variety of constructive delivery.7
On the other hand, Mechem, in perhaps the most exhaustive treat-
ment of this subject available, states that the authorities are in general
agreement that the principal distinction between a symbolic and a
constructive delivery is in the amount of control vested in the donee
by the delivery.8 Thus, the former is defined as "a substitute for
manual tradition which gives to the deliveree a symbol of or evidence
of right, but gives him no control over the res" 9 and the latter is dis-
tinguished as "a substitute for manual tradition, which to a greater or
less degree confers on the deliveree a physical access to or control over
4 Bryant's Adm'r v. Bryant, 269 S.W. 2d 219 (Ky. 1954); Pikeville National
Bank v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 150, 135 S.W. 2d 426 (1939); Scherzinger v. Scherzinger,
280 Ky. 44, 132 S.W. 2d 537 (1939); Taylor v. Purdy, 151 Ky. 82, 151 S.W. 45(1912); Stephenson's Adm'r v. King, 81 Ky. 425 (1883).
5 Dickerson v. Snyder, 209 Ky. 212, 215, 272 S.W. 384, 385 (1925), where
the court said ". . . and where the circumstances are such that the given property
cannot be physically delivered it may be done so symbolically or constructively.
A frequent illustration of the latter character of delivery is where the given property
is not in the immediate presence of the donor and its nonaccessibility prevents him
from transferring its custody from himself to the donee or his selected repre-
sentative or agent, in which case the donor must deliver something to symbolize
the corporeal property which is the subject matter of the gift, and which fre-
quently is a key to some sort of receptacle in which the property is kept and
wherein it was contained at the time." In lumping symbolic and constructive
delivery together as one type the court obviously is ignoring any distinction
between them.
6 McCoy's Adm'r v. McCoy, 126 Ky. 783, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1189, 104 S.W.
1031 (1907).
7 Ballentine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 1930.8 Mechem, Delivery of Gifts of Chattels, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 341, 457, 568 (1926).
9 Id. at 471; see also Brown, op. cit. supra note 1, at 92.
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or possession of the res."10 On the surface this distinction appears
helpful, but in reality it makes symbolic delivery an empty category
and overburdens the constructive delivery category to the point of
uselessness. This results from excluding from the symbolic category
all deliveries in which the means of control is passed. In very few
cases will the delivery of a mere token or symbol suffice to divest the
donor of his dominion and control, an oft-cited requisite for the show-
ing of a complete and unequivocal delivery." Therefore, in all cases
where actual delivery is impossible it would be necessary to classify
the delivery as constructive, making this a vague, catch-all category.
This would increase, not decrease, the confusion.12
In view of the inadequacies in the generally accepted definitions
just discussed, it may be helpful to state the writer's own definitions
of the three types of delivery before undertaking a classification of
delivery situations in the Kentucky cases. The definitions stated are
designed to achieve at least five objectives: (1) to satisfy the basic
requirement of delivery, that is, stand as an unequivocal act which will
make the donor's purpose clear, (2) to include in the three categories
as a whole all valid deliveries and to exclude therefrom all invalid
deliveries, (3) to establish a distinct line of demarcation between
categories, (4) to insure that each category will represent a type of
valid delivery and will not be an empty category, and (5) to be as
consistent as possible with the Kentucky decisions to be discussed.
Actual delivery is simply the absolute, most unequivocal delivery of
the res possible. Although this will require manual tradition of the
subject in most cases, in gifts of intangibles, chattels of great bulk and
some few other subjects a transfer of something other than the subject
may be sufficient even though it does not serve as the means of con-
lo Ibid.
11 Pikeville Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 150, 135 S.W. 2d
426 (1939); Goodan v. Goodan, 184 Ky. 79, 211 S.W. 423 (1919); Dick v. Har-
ris' Ex'r, 145 Ky. 739, 141 S.W. 56 (1911); McCoy's Adm'r v. McCoy, 126 Ky.
783, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1189, 104 S.W. 1031 (1907).
12Such confusion would arise from the commingling under the one term two
types of cases, one being the situation mentioned above wherein the means of
control is passed, the other being that group of cases where actually no delivery
is made but where the donor dearly manifests his intention to make a gift, a
truly constructive delivery. Such a case is Swafford v. Spratt, 93 Mo. App. 631,
635, 67 S.W. 701 (1902), wherein the court said: "A constructive delivery is
when, without actual transfer of the goods or their symbol, the conduct of the
parties is such as to be inconsistent with any other supposition than that there
as been a change in the nature of the holding- ."
Kentucky, without labelling the delivery' has found a valid gift in several
such situations. Bryant's Adm'r v. Bryant, 269 S.W. 2d 219 (1954) (Joint owner-
ship of store); Collins v. Collins' Adm'r, 242 Ky. 5, 45 S.W. 2d 811 (1931) (Bank
deposit made in name of donee-no passbook delivered); Simmonds v. Simmonds'
Adm'r, 133 Ky. 493, 118 S.W. 304 (1909) (Subject at time of gift in possession
of another).
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trol over the property. Symbolic delivery is defined as a substitute for
actual delivery where the nature of the gift or circumstances of the
case make actual delivery impossible at the time of the gift, and where
the symbol delivered vests the control of, or access to, the property in
the donee. The fact that an actual delivery might have been made at
another time is of no consequence in determining the validity of the
delivery actually made. Constructive delivery is defined as a sub-
stitute for actual delivery where the donor performs some equivocal
act which might be construed as an act of delivery and which is made
certain by a strong manifestation of donative intent. This type of
delivery is clearly distinguishable from symbolic delivery and is limited
in scope only by the decision of the court in the particular case as to
the sufficiency of the donor's manifestation of intent. The usefulness
of these definitions is clearly demonstrated in applying them to illus-
trative Kentucky cases under each category.
II
AcrTUAL Dsanray
Two similar cases falling for the most part outside the classic con-
cept of manual tradition but within the suggested definition of actual
delivery are Goodan v. Goodan's Adm'r13 and Gray's Adm'er v. Dixon.14
In the Goodan case the donor delivered to one of the donees an en-
dorsed note, a title bond, and a certain amount in cash, to be dis-
tributed among the other donees according to the donor's instructions.
In a settlement of donor's estate, the court sustained the gift, finding
an actual delivery of the note, bond and cash. In the Gray case the
donor on his deathbed handed the donee a government bond and
certain notes; the court sustained the gift because the delivery was
sufficient. Obviously, the manual tradition of the money in the Goodan
case satisfied the strictest definition of actual delivery. And it is sub-
mitted that the delivery of the bonds and notes in both cases is also
properly classified as an actual delivery, because it would be im-
possible in any circumstances to transfer the real subject matter-the
future right to the money owed. The transfer, then, of the only tangi-
ble existence of that future right constitutes the most absolute, un-
equivocal delivery possible. In effect, it is no different than delivery
of the money.
13 Supra note 12.
14255 Ky. 239, 73 S.W. 2d 6 (1934).
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A similar situation exists where the subject matter of the gift is
corporate stock.15 Clearly, no more absolute method for transferring
such intangibles as the right to vote or the right to share in corporate
earnings can be found than the delivery of the certificate which en-
titles one to these rights. The Kentucky court recognized this in two
cases where delivery of the certificate was unquestionably made by
failing to question in any way the sufficiency of the delivery.'6 Con-
versely, the court has consistently turned down attempted gifts of
corporate stock where delivery of the certificate, even though properly
endorsed, has not been made.17
An unusual instance of actual delivery is illustrated in a recent
case where the donor purchased a lottery ticket in the name of her
niece and delivered the ticket with statements of gift to her sister for
her niece's benefit.18 The donor had a change of heart when the
ticket won a new automobile, but the court upheld the gift. The
opinion refers to the delivery as symbolic, but it is clear that an actual
delivery was in fact made, because the ticket was the only tangible
existence of the subject capable of delivery. No more absolute transfer
of the intangible chance to win could have been made.
SymBonic DELviy
The Goodan and Gray cases already discussed afford an excellent
opportunity to distinguish between actual delivery and symbolic or
constructive delivery. In both of these cases, in addition to the notes
and bonds previously mentioned, there was an attempted gift of a bank
deposit. In the Goodan case, the donor made delivery of a joint bank
certificate, subsequently causing a new certificate to be made out in
the donee's name. The court called this a constructive delivery, but
it is more properly classified as a symbolic delivery, since there was a
transfer of the means of control, thus eliminating the necessity for
recourse to the weaker concept of constructive delivery. But is it pos-
sible that there was no need for recourse to the symbolic delivery
concept either, on the ground that the certificate was the only tangible
existence of the money on deposit? The answer is no. The certificate
15 This classification of the delivery of stocks, bonds, notes and other such
papers which merely evidence the intangible subject finds support in the law of
assignment. It is there that the name specialty-choses-in-action is generally ap-
plied to them, and it is well settled that the delivery of the "specialty" transfers
with it the intangible right which it represents.
10 York's Ancillary Adm'r v. Bromley, 286 Ky. 533, 151 S.W. 2d 28 (1941);
Trevathan's Exr v. Dees' Ex'rs, 221 Ky. 396, 298 S.W. 975 (1927).
17Dawson v. Dawson's Adm'x, 272 S.W. 2d 666 (Ky. 1954); Biehl v.
Biehl's Adm'x, 263 Ky. 710, 93 S.W. 2d 836 (1936).
18 Hardy v. St. Matthews' Community Center, supra note 3.
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was not the only tangible existence of the subject matter, because the
subject was presently available. The money itself might have been
delivered, and therefore the most absolute delivery possible was not
made. Only the means of control passed, so only a symbolic delivery
was made.
In the Gray case there was delivery of the passbook to a checking
account. The court, refusing to find a distinction between a checking
and a savings account, found a valid delivery even though, it said, the
accepted means of control over a checking account is by check.' 9 There
was no actual delivery here for the same reason advanced in discussing
the Goodan case. Since the donor could have made an actual delivery
of the money, nothing less than that may be considered an actual
delivery. In fact, since the passbook to a checking account in no way
represents the means of control over the money, transfer of it may not
even properly be called a symbolic delivery. Instead, there was a con-
structive delivery here, because the validity of the gift turned primarily
on the strong manifestation of intent to renounce dominion and control
and vest them in the donee. Although the delivery was equivocal, the
intent was strong, and in such a case the court will indulge in a fiction
to sustain the gift; it will find a delivery where the existence of one in
fact is doubtful.20
19 Clearly, the court here is not in agreement with the majority of Kentucky
decisions regarding the validity of a gift by check. Kentucky follows the general
rule that a check is merely an order to pay, revocable at any time prior to pay-
ment. The Kentucky view was clearly stated in Foxworthy v. Adams, 136 Ky. 403,
407, 124 S.W. 381, 382, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 308 (1910), where the court said, "The
rule is that a gift of one's own check is incomplete until the check has been paid or
accepted by the bank. 'A check, being a mere order or authority to the payee
to draw the amount called for, when given without consideration, may be
countermanded or revoked by the maker so long as it remains unacted on in the
hands of the payee. . . . A difference must be noted, however, between an
ordinary personal check and cashier's checks or bank drafts. This is illustrated in
the case of Pikeville National Bank and Trust Co. v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 150, 135
S.W. 2d 426 (1939), where the donor, a suicide, mailed a cashier's check to his
wife. The court clearly distinguished between this and an ordinary check as to
the validity of the delivery but failed to spell out the reason. It might be argued
that the reason is that a cashier's check so approximates money itself that a
delivery of it constitutes an actual delivery. This is refutable, though, since the
money itself is presently available and on a delivery of the money could con-
stitute an actual delivery. Instead, this is a valid symbolic delivery, because the
donor vested a complete control in the donee over the money represented by the
check. In no way could he revoke the gift after control passed to the donee.
20 The findings in these cases on this point have been substantiated in later
cases. In Aubrey's Adm'x v. Kent, 292 Ky. 740, 745, 167 S.W. 2d 831, 833
(1942), the court said, "The delivery of the savings account passbook consum-
mates its gift and transfers the money on deposit to the donee if that was the
intention and purpose of the donor. This, it is generally said, is because such
book is equivalent to a certificate of deposit, the presentation of which authorizes
withdrawal of the funds." (Writers italics) Likewise, in Scherzinger v. Scher-
zinger, 280 Ky. 44, 132 S.W. 2d 537 (1939), the delivery by donor of a cer-
tificate of deposit with the statement that donee was to have her name added
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In at least one class of cases, those involving delivery of a key, the
court has labeled the delivery as symbolic. To the extent that the key
in question represents the means of control over the subject, this is a
correct categorization. In Moore v. Shifflett,21 for instance, the invalid
donor directed a trusted friend to lock the money in question in a
dresser and then entrusted the dresser key to the friend to be de-
livered subsequently to the donee. This undoubtedly effected a trans-
fer of the means of control. The same was true in Farris v. Farris,2 2
where the donor made a gift of stock by delivering to a third party at-
torney the key to the safety deposit box containing the certificates.
Control clearly passed to the donee.
CONSThUCriVE DELiVERY
Constructive delivery cannot be defined as precisely as the other
two types because the emphasis is on the donor's manifestation of in-
tent. Clearly the donor's intent needs to be very strong, since it must,
to a certain extent, replace the act of delivery which itself is required
primarily for the purpose of making certain the donor's intentions. In
short, the gift must be sustained almost solely on intent. Therefore,
any limits to the category can be determined only on the facts of the
particular case. This is forcefully illustrated in the case of Simmonds v.
Sinmonds" Adm'r..2 3 There the donor attempted to make a gift of cer-
tain notes which were in the possession of her daughter, who refused
to surrender them for delivery to the donee. Despite this, the court
enforced the gift on the strength of abundant uncontradicted testi-
mony showing strong donative intent. In addition, it was apparent
that the actions of the daughter were intended to upset the gift, which
worked to her disadvantage. The court simply circumvented the
accepted delivery requirements and sustained the gift primarily on the
basis of strong intent coupled with an equivocal act of attempted de-
livery. Though admittedly an extreme case, it is an example of a valid
constructive delivery.
Similarly, in the recent case of Bryant's Adm'r v. Bryant,24 title to a
store was given to the donee, even though no unequivocal act of de-
livery either actual or symbolic was made, because of the joint pur-
was held a valid gift. In each case the transfer was less than the most perfect
delivery to be made of the subject but did constitute delivery of the most effective
means of control of that subject. Thus, in each case a clear cut symbolic delivery
was made.
" 187 Ky. 7, 216 S.W. 614 (1920).
22269 Ky. 466, 107 S.W. 2d 299 (1937).
23 1:3,3 Ky. 493, 118 S.V. 304 (1909).
24 269 S.W. 2d 219 (1954).
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chase and joint operation of the store. Validity of the gift was allowed
to turn on the basis of testimony establishing that the donee had filed
a declaration of ownership to which the donor had frequently declared
his assent, and on other testimony showing that donee had been al-
lowed to act as sole owner. No one act on the part of the donor con-
stituted a delivery, but taken in toto all of his acts clearly evidenced
his intent to make a gift. Therefore, the court properly sustained it
even though the delivery was necessarily constructive.
Another situation for the constructive delivery is illustrated in Col-
lins v. Collins' Adm'r,25 where the donor made a savings bank deposit
in the names of his infant children but made no delivery of the pass-
book to them. The children made no use of the account. The donor
used the account but all of his checks and deposits were made in the
names of the donees. In spite of conflicting evidence, the court found
that the presumption of intent to make a gift raised by the deposit in
the name of the donee was not overcome, saying:
A thorough consideration of the authorities here and in other juris-
dictions leads to the conclusion that, in order to perfect a gift by the
deposit of money in the bank in the name of an infant donee, it will
be assumed that it was intended as a gift unless that presumption is
rebutted by facts indicating a different purpose. If the deposit is
accompanied by declarations or acts showing an intention of divesting
control over the fund and of vesting it in the donee, it will be given
effect as a completed gift.26
The term constructive delivery was not used in the opinion but it
seems clear that the court's statements support the proposed definition
of the category. The deposit of the money, an equivocal act at best,
can serve as the delivery peg on which to hang the gift, but its support
comes from the clear manifestation of donative intent.27
Kelley-Koett Mfg. Co. v. Goldenberg28 is a good example of a case
where the donor's intent is not sufficiently strong to overcome an in-
conclusive act of delivery. The directors of the defendant corporation
voted to issue the plaintiff, their employee, one share of stock. This
was substantiated by the corporate records. However, the minutes of
the meeting and the share of stock were never signed by the president,
25 242 Ky. 5, 45 S.W. 2d 811 (1931).
26 Id. at 13, 45 S.W. 2d at 815.
27 It is worthy of note that the virtually extinct requirement of accetance may
be controlling in these cases. In the case of an infant, as in the Co "ns case, it
will be presumed and a constructive delivery will thus be found. Where the donee
is an adult, though, actual acceptance must be shown in order for the court to
fictionalize a delivery. See Peters Adm'r v. Peters, 224 Ky. 493, 6 S.W. 2d 499,
59 A.L.R. 969 (1928), where the court refused to find such a gift to an adult son
on the ground that without any knowledge or acceptance complete control and
power to revoke remained in the donor.28207 Ky. 695, 27 S.W. 15 (1925).
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the share was never detached from the stock book, neither the share
nor the stock book was ever delivered to the plaintiff, and nothing
further was done by either party to transfer ownership during the
remaining year and a half of plaintiff's employment or during the re-
maining nine years before the suit was filed. In view of the mere
evidentiary nature of corporate records and the weight of parol evi-
dence tending to contradict them, the court properly held that no de-
livery had been made. The case clearly falls outside of our definition
of constructive delivery since there was insufficient manifestation of
intention.
III
In view of the definitions posed at the beginning and the illustrative
decisions discussed, is there some predictable basis or pattern for de-
termining the nature and validity of a delivery in Kentucky? The
answer to this question seems to lie in a step-by-step procedure for
evaluating the facts of each case. The first and most basic considera-
tion in any such procedure must be an exact determination of the sub-
ject of the gift. Only after this is established may one proceed to a
categorization of the delivery involved. To do this one first asks, is
there evidence that the least equivocal, most absolute delivery of the
subject matter possible was made? If so, there is a valid actual de-
livery. If not, the gift may be invalid unless a symbolic or constructive
delivery can be found. Therefore, is the delivery as complete and
absolute as the nature and the circumstances of the gift will permit
at the time the delivery is made? If not, the gift is invalid, but if the
delivery does meet this test, it is either symbolic or constructive. In
order to determine which it is, does the thing delivered give the donee
control of the subject? Is it the means of control? If it is, a valid
symbolic delivery has been made. If not, the gift is invalid, unless a
constructive delivery can be made out. The question then narrows to
this: do the facts of the case show any act, even an equivocal one,
which can serve as an act of gift when coupled with a clear manifesta-
tion of donative intent and renunciation of control? If so, a valid con-
structive delivery has been made.
The usefulness of this formula is best illustrated by applying it to
some of the more difficult borderline gift cases. An early case of this
sort was Brown v. Brown's Adm'r,29 where the donees were the illegiti-
mate sons of the donor. Although unable to provide for them as part
of his family, the donor sought to help them by paying a promissory
2043 Ky. 535 (1844).
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note of theirs on which he was surety. The note was never delivered
to the donees, who lived some seventy miles away, but it was men-
tioned frequently by the donor, who stated his intention to "help the
boys" in this way.
What was the subject of this gift? The court, influenced by the
more strict delivery requirements of the time, treated the money as the
subject and held that an actual delivery of the subject had been made
upon payment of the note. In view of the modem development of the
delivery concept, however, it would seem more realistic to treat the
note as the subject. Although it is obvious that the money was de-
livered, it was not delivered to the donees or to anyone for them. It
was given to the bank and might well have been given to buy the note
for investment purposes. The note, on the other hand, is subject to
none of these limitations. Moreover, it was the item in question be-
tween the parties; it was in fact the subject of the dispute. Was the
delivery of the note the least equivocal, most absolute delivery of the
subject that could have been made? Since the note was found among
the donor's papers upon his death, the answer clearly is no. Therefore,
no actual delivery was made. But, was as complete and absolute a
delivery of the note made as the nature and circumstances of the gift
would permit at the time of its making? In this particular case the
gift was not clearly made at any one time, and so this question can-
not be answered with certainty. One must then determine if the de-
livery transferred the means of control of the subject to the donee.
Certainly it did not, because nothing at all was actually given the
donee. Therefore, no symbolic delivery could have been made. Finally,
then, do the facts show any act, though equivocal, which might have
served as an act of gift and which was solidly supported by the clear
manifestation of the donor that a gift was intended? The act of pur-
chasing the note, though equivocal, serves this purpose. In fact, the
court settled the case upon this act. Support this with the clear, con-
vincing evidence presented to show the donor's manifestation of dona-
tive intent and there is a clear case of constructive delivery, an equiv-
ocal act made certain by the manifestations of the donor. Although
there is no difference in result, this basis for enforcing the gift is more
realistic than that used by the court.
A difficult problem is found in Taylor v. Purdy,30 where a creditor
of the deceased donor attacked as testamentary in character a deed of
gift to the donees. The deed conveyed all of the donor's "right, title,
and interest in any real estate and all the personal estate of every kind"
30 151 Ky. 82, 151 S.W. 45 (1912).
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which he then had or might have at the time of his death. The court
held that the gift of personal property when evidenced by a written
instrument executed by the donor was valid although no manual de-
livery of the property was made, but chose not to rationalize this. In
analyzing the case it is no problem to answer our first question. The
subject of the gift is undoubtedly all of the "right, title, and interest"
that the donor had in any real estate or personalty. This makes our
second question a difficult one to answer. Was this the most absolute
delivery that could possibly have been made? Clearly, the delivery of
the realty by deed was the most absolute possible; this is the normal
and unquestioned method of conveying title to property absolutely.
However, the real problem here is in regard to the personal property.
Was the delivery of the deed to the personalty the most absolute pos-
sible? Certainly, delivery of a deed of gift to any single item would
not be, since manual tradition would generally be possible. Neither
should the deed in such a case be considered a symbolic delivery,
though such a categorization is frequent, for the simple reason that no
control is passed. Instead, the delivery is constructive, the writing
constituting a very clear manifestation of the donor's intent and thereby
strengthening what would otherwise be an equivocal, token delivery.
However, in the instant case where the donor seeks to give all of his
personalty in one fell swoop, is it not more realistic to say that manual
tradition of the entire lot is virtually impossible and that delivery of a
deed to the personalty thereby constitutes the most absolute delivery
possible? The answer must be yes, and therefore, it is a valid actual
delivery. As in the Brown case, there is a concurrence with the court
in result, but concurrence on a more logical basis.
Another difficult delivery problem is presented in joint possession
cases such as Morgan v. Williams,31 where the donor sought to give an
automobile to the donee, who lived with her. There was substantial
testimony for each side. The plaintiff donee showed clearly that the
car was purchased with intent to give it to her and that she had the
unrestricted use of the automobile after its purchase. The defendant
showed that, despite this, the automobile was registered and insured
in donor's name, that donor paid all expenses of operation, kept it in
her garage and even authorized an agent to sell the auto shortly be-
fore her death. The court, weighing this evidence, sustained the gift,
saying:
To be effectual, delivery must be according to the nature and char-
acter of the thing given and where donee lives with donor and the
gift of the automobile, as well as the right to use and control it with-
31 179 Ky. 428, 200 S.W. 650 (1918).
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out the permission of the donor, is clearly shown, the mere fact that
the donor keeps the machine in her garage, or wishes to supplement
her kindness by paying all the expenses incident to the operation of
the machine cannot be regarded as the retention of such dominion
over the machine as to render the gift ineffective.3 2
In analyzing this case it is apparent that the subject of the gift is
the automobile. And it is equally clear that the absolute, most un-
equivocal delivery possible would be a single act of giving the keys
and the car simultaneously. In view of this there was no actual de-
livery here. But was there a symbolic delivery;-a transfer of the means
of control, the keys to the car? Undoubtedly there was, not once, but
many times. But since in daily life such a transaction is a very com-
mon occurrence, it might well be inconsistent with a gift and indica-
tive of only a bailment. Therefore, to find any concrete basis for en-
forcing the gift it is necessary to rely on the constructive delivery con-
cept. Since the delivery of the keys was equivocal, yet clearly an act
possible of construction as a gift, the validity of the gift rests finally
on the donor's manifestation of intention. Did the donor manifest so
strong an intent to give that the gift should be sustained despite an
equivocal act of delivery? The court felt that she did. In view of the
conflicting nature of the evidence and the apparent equal weight on
each side, it seems more realistic to say that she did not, that no clear
manifestation of intent was shown. But this, it would seem, is an in-
evitable difference of opinion in such cases. This case undoubtedly
represents the extremity of the constructive delivery concept where
final determination of validity must rest on opinion.
I. Leland Brewster
REAL PROPERTY-NOTICE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
IN KENTUCKY
Restrictive covenants that run with the land are enforceable against
a subsequent purchaser only if he has notice of them.1 This note dis-
cusses the various ways of obtaining notice of restrictive covenants in
Kentucky including actual, implied, inquiry, and constructive notice.
For classification purposes the kinds of notice may be defined as fol-
lows: Actual notice is information concerning the existence of the
32 Id. at 431, 200 S.W. at 652.
1 A purchaser will be bound, either by his knowledge o fthe covenant or by
constructive notice from the record thereof. Patton on Titles, 1036 (1938). Also
note 14 Am. Jur. Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, 659-663.
